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In The Principles of Psychology, William James not only recognizes 
his debt to Carl Stumpf regarding the perception of space and the 
psychology of sound, but he also considers Stumpf as “the most philo-
sophical and profound of all writers” (James 1890, 911). James and 
Stumpf maintained a friendly relationship since they first met in Pra-
gue in 1882 and had a considerable correspondence, which testifies to 
an evident interest in each other’s work in the field of psychology (cf. 
Dazzi, 1994). In 1928, Stumpf published a small book dedicated 
entirely to this correspondence, in which he expressed his esteem and 
affection for James, whom, on the occasion of the latter’s nomination 
as a corresponding member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, 
Stumpf describes as “the most outstanding philosophical mind that the 
new world has created until now.” In this work, Stumpf claims that, 
beyond his criticism of James’s psychology, there is a broad consen-
sus between his Erfahrungsphilosophie and James’s radical 
empiricism, namely regarding their world view and their methods: 
 
From a methodological point of view, he calls [his world view] radical 
empiricism, because (from a purely intellectual point of view) it 
acknowledges all and only what is given in experience as real. No 
covering up, no escape through reasoning, but only taking things as 
they are: this is probably the most general maxim of this theory of 
knowledge. (1928b, 31) 
 
                                                            
* I would like to thank Kevin Mulligan for his comments on earlier versions of this 
paper and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its 
financial support. 
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However, this starting point in what is given in experience is not only 
a maxim, but also represents for both proponents of empiricism the 
primary source of all contents and concepts of thought (cf. Stumpf 
1928b, 22). Despite this consensus on method, Stumpf does not es-
pouse James’s sensualism, as evidenced by his criticism of James’s 
theory of emotions. 
Stumpf’s long-lasting relationship with Brentano is well known, 
and despite his significant deviations from Brentano’s philosophy, 
Stumpf always unequivocally advocated Brentano’s philosophical 
program until his very last work, Erkenntnislehre, which is in fact 
dedicated to Brentano. Stumpf’s main departures from Brentano’s 
psychology are quite obvious with respect to his views on emotions. 
Indeed, Brentano’s position on emotions and sensory feelings repre-
sents the counterpart of James’s sensualism, and this opposition 
corresponds exactly to the distinction that Stumpf established between 
emotions, which are intentional states such as beliefs and desires, and 
what he calls Gefühlsempfindungen or sensory feelings, which are 
sensations, such as colours and sounds. In all his writings on affective 
states, Stumpf opposed sensualism to a form of mentalism as epito-
mized by the work of Wundt or by Brentano’s representationalism, 
which Stumpf accused of committing the opposite error to that of 
sensualism insofar as it reduces sensory feelings to objects or proper-
ties of mental states. In short, Stumpf's position on this issue is prima 
facie a kind of compromise between James’ and Brentano’s views in 
that he argues against Brentano that sensory feelings are necessary 
conditions of emotional experience in general, and against James, that 
this phenomenal dimension of emotional experience is not by itself a 
sufficient condition. Ultimately, the main issue at the heart of this 
debate is the distinction introduced by Stumpf in 1906 between mental 
states and phenomena, and more generally the distinction between 
phenomenology understood as the science of phenomena and psy-
chology understood in a narrow sense as the science of functions or 
mental states. 
Stumpf’s three main papers on the topic of affective states are col-
lected in a book published in 1928 under the title Gefühl und 
Gefühlsempfindungen, in which one also finds a substantial introduc-
tion on the classification of affective states.1 The first two articles are 
                                                            
1 The references to Stumpf’s three papers (Stumpf 1899, 1907, 1916b) are taken from 
Stumpf (1928a).  
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complementary: the first, published in 1899 under the title "Über den 
Begriff der Gemütsbewegung" deals with emotions and is specifically 
directed against James’ sensualist theory of emotions (Stumpf 1924, 
46); in the second article, entitled “Über Gefühlsempfidungen” and 
published in 1907, Stumpf examines three theories of sensory feel-
ings. The latter article belongs to a period of change in the thought of 
Stumpf and is the result of extensive research, the findings of which 
were presented to the Berlin Academy of Sciences in 1905 and pub-
lished the following year in two important treatises (1906a, 1906b). I 
have in mind, more specifically, Stumpf’s article “Phenomena and 
Psychical Functions,” in which substantial changes are made to his 
theory of sense perception and his views on phenomena put forth in 
his 1899 paper. This is also confirmed in his lectures on psychology 
delivered in the winter semester of 1907, in which great importance is 
attached to James’ views on emotions. Stumpf’s prevailing views on 
affects during this period remained unchanged until his last book, 
Erkenntnislehre, published posthumously. Finally, another important 
source of Stumpf’s discussions on the topic of emotions is his rich 
correspondence with Brentano, which we will examine in the second 
part of this study. 
 
1 Stumpf’s classification of mental states 
The starting point of the controversy that opposes Stumpf to Brentano 
and James on the nature of affective states and sensory feelings lies in 
the distinction between emotions and sensory feelings. There are 
several types of sensation that fall under the category of sensory feel-
ings:  
 
[First] the purely bodily pains (that is, those which appear without any 
essential involvement of intellectual functions), whether they are set 
up from within or from without the organism; secondly, the feeling of 
bodily well-being in its more general and in its more special forms, 
the latter of which includes the pleasure component in a tickle, the 
feeling produced by an itch, and sexual feelings; and lastly the agree-
ableness and disagreeableness that may be connected, in the most 
various degrees of gradation, with the sensations of all or nearly all 
the “special” senses, with temperatures, odours, tastes, tones, colours. 
(Stumpf 1928a, 54-55) 
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Stumpf argues that there is a specific difference between sensory 
feelings, which are sensory qualities such as colours and sounds, and 
emotions, which are defined in terms of “an affective state which is 
directed toward a judged state of affairs” (1928a, 56). The essential 
difference between elementary feelings and emotions lies in the fact 
that the latter is directed toward complex objects, and more specifical-
ly, toward states of affairs, thereby presupposing a judgment: 
 
Concerning states of feelings which undoubtedly and in the most ap-
propriate sense of the term belong to the class of affects, we are 
saying that they relate to a state of affairs about which we are pleased, 
angry, irritated, afraid, etc. That is to say, the affect is founded on a 
judgment. In contrast, the sensory agreeableness of a colour or a taste 
is triggered directly by the sensory impression. (1928a, 2-3) 
 
Let us for the moment leave aside the topic of sensory feelings in 
order to concentrate on Stumpf’s conception of emotions proper. The 
simplest way to approach this complex topic is through the classifica-
tion of mental states which Stumpf presents in the preface to his 1928 
book. 
Unlike Brentano, Stumpf recognizes only two major classes of 
functions or mental states, namely, intellectual functions and emotion-
al functions. This classification is based on a distinction put forth 
between two possible modes of intentional relations through which 
consciousness refers to its objects. To these two modes of intentional 
relations correspond two distinct types of attitudes (Stellungnahmen) 
directed toward their objects, namely, a pleasurable (gemütlich) atti-
tude (1928a, 68) with respect to the class of affective states, and a 
cognitive stance in the case of the class of judgments, i.e., affirmation 
and negation. All functions that fall under one of these two classes are 
related hierarchically with one another, so that the functions of the 
second class, which are more complex, presuppose and are based on 
the functions of the first. The most basic function is sensory percep-
tion, which is directly related to sensory phenomena and, thus, 
represents the basis of this classification. Between perception and 
judgments we must also presuppose numerous operations, such as 
abstraction and concept formation, which provide higher states of this 
class with their conceptual content (1906a, 4-5). 
Stumpf distinguishes the class of affective functions, to which 
emotions belong, from the class of intellectual functions. To under-
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stand the nature of emotions, we must also consider a new division 
within the field of affective functions, that of passive and active states. 
The subclass of active affects is dominated by desires (Begehrungen), 
which in turn is subdivided into elementary desires (instincts) and 
volitional acts. Stumpf says very little about these basic desires except 
that they are instincts (like hunger) and that they presuppose and are 
based on passive elementary feelings (1928, xv). In his 1907 lectures 
on psychology, Stumpf defines these as Lustgefühle, which are essen-
tially linked to behaviour and are related to volitional actions in the 
same way that elementary feelings are related to emotions in the class 
of active states. However, there are important differences between 
these two subclasses, the most important of which being that only 
active affects lead to (instinctive or volitional) actions. Stumpf uses 
the term Streben (striving, or what in today’s action theory would be 
called an “act of trying”) to characterize the elementary feelings of 
this subclass (1940, 837). Although this term refers to a tendency or 
an orientation toward something, which is also the main characteristic 
of mental states proper, it does not fall under the concept of intention-
ality mainly because the instinctive states that we find in animals lack 
concepts and, therefore, intentional contents. It refers rather to a be-
havioural disposition. The term Seinsollen (ought to be), by which 
Stumpf characterizes this class of affective functions, designates 
precisely this tendency toward a goal, i.e., a value understood as the 
prime object of desire, the latter being an intention or a plan to be 
achieved through voluntary actions (1928, p. xv). Values are for this 
subclass of active affective states what states of affairs are for judg-
ments. Passion, envy, wishes, and will are all desires whose content is 
a value, or to quote Stumpf, “an ought to be in accordance with the 
intention of the desiring [subject]” (1940, 836), and by “intention,” he 
means “something which appears to the desiring subject as somehow 
a consequence of his momentary valuable state” (1940, 837). 
Emotions belong to the subclass of passive sentiments. Affects are 
called passive when they have as an object something existent, i.e., the 
object of a true judgment, while active affects are obligations (1928a, 
ix). The class of passive affects is subdivided into elementary feelings 
and emotional states. The essential difference between these two 
subclasses is that elementary feelings are triggered directly by sensory 
phenomena without the aid of any other classes of functions and their 
contents, be they judgments or concepts, while emotions, which are 
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intentional states directed toward states of affairs, presuppose the 
formation of concepts and conceptual thought broadly understood 
(1928a, ix). The basic difference between elementary feelings and 
emotions is one of complexity, and it is comparable to the difference 
between an accomplished musician and a novice. 
Let us focus on the structure of an act of judgment given the lat-
ter’s fundamental role in Stumpf’s definition of an emotion as a 
passive affective state directed toward a state of affairs. Stumpf dis-
tinguishes, in an act of judging, between the latter's quality, matter, 
content, and object. The quality of judgment is affirmation and nega-
tion, and that which is affirmed or rejected is its content or meaning. 
As in Brentano, the matter of an existential judgment of the form “this 
rectangular table exists” is provided by the presentation of “table” and 
“rectangular,” which presuppose of course the formation of the corre-
sponding concepts. Unlike Meinong, and in agreement with Husserl, 
Stumpf conceives of states of affairs as truth-makers, whereas (propo-
sitional) contents of judgment are considered truth-bearers. The truth 
of this proposition depends partly on the appropriateness of the quality 
of this state to its matter (1939, 61) and partly on internal perception. 
The content of a judgment is also distinct from its object, i.e., from the 
state of affairs taken to be an existent true judgment. When Stumpf 
says that states of affairs are expressed linguistically in subordinate 
clauses of the form “that P”, he has in mind an indirect judgment in 
which the state of affairs is considered as the matter of a new judg-
ment such as “that P is true or evident” or “I wish or desire that P.” 
However, in a direct judgment, P stands for the content of the proposi-
tional attitude (Gebilde) and not for the judged state of affairs. 
Furthermore, when Stumpf claims that emotions are based on judg-
ments and that they have states of affairs as objects, judgments and 
state of affairs must be understood in a very broad sense. For the 
object of an emotion can be a state of affairs, known or believed, that 
we formulate in the linguistic form of a statement or as something that 
we think of conceptually (1928a, 13); however, it does not necessarily 
involve an actual or explicit judgment. 
Stumpf’s classification raises several questions, in particular, re-
garding the justification of subsuming emotions under the same class 
as desire and will, given their significant structural differences. For, to 
use John Searle’s terminology (1983), desires and intentions (and 
will) have different conditions of satisfaction and different directions 
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of fit: the fulfilment of the object of a desire requires a change in the 
world, and accordingly, its direction of fit is a world-to-mind relation, 
whereas judgments (and emotions) have the opposite direction of fit 
insofar as they must fit with the existing state of affairs; their condi-
tions of satisfaction therefore coincide with their truth conditions, and 
their direction of fit is a mind-to-world relation. Of course, Stumpf’s 
criterion for this classification is not the structure but the quality of an 
act, i.e., the attitude or stance toward one and the same state of affairs. 
However, we will see that it is also difficult to subsume these two 
subclasses under one and the same attitude. Stumpf’s definition of 
emotions raises further problems, namely, the relation between emo-
tion and judgment and that of emotion and sensory feelings, which we 
will examine in the fourth section.  
 
2 Criticism of James’s sensualist theory of emotions 
In his paper “Über Gefühlsempfindungen,” Stumpf distinguished 
between three competing theories of sensory feelings, to which corre-
spond, respectively, the positions of James, Wundt, and Stumpf 
himself (Titchener, 1908). Stumpf claims that Brentano, like himself, 
advocates the third theory, according to which sensory feelings are 
themselves sensations: 
 
The so-called sensory feelings or affective tone of sensations are 
themselves sensations (Sinnesempfindungen). Therefore, they do not 
belong to the functional side but to the objective side of conscious-
ness, not to the mental states but to the material, provided that colours, 
sounds, and noises belong to the objective side and to the material of 
consciousness and in the same way that we usually do it. (1928a, 93) 
 
However, this is not Brentano’s position, as confirmed by his corre-
spondence and a long footnote to his paper “From the psychological 
analysis of sound qualities in their properly first elements,” also pub-
lished in 1907. In fact Brentano’s position in this regard is far from 
clear, as Stumpf wrote to James in a letter from 1899: 
 
It seems that you have not yet received the last article that I sent you, 
‘Über den Begriff der Gemütsbewegung.’ Since I took there a position 
which is opposed to your theory, I originally intended to send an ac-
companying letter [...]. Between Brentano and me things have taken a 
curious turn. I thought that I was rather in agreement with him, in re-
spect to emotions, and now I have received a letter from him, seven 
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pages long, in which he definitely declares himself in favour of your 
views and against mine. (Stumpf in Dazzi 1994, 247) 
 
This passage suggests that Stumpf also seems to have associated 
Brentano with the first theory, i.e., to James’s sensualism. However, 
Brentano in fact advocated a version of the second theory according to 
which sensory feelings belong to a kind of mental state and to the 
same genus as emotions (Stumpf 1928a, 108). Brentano’s position on 
that issue stands out clearly in his theory of primary and secondary 
objects, which we will discuss in the next section.  
James advocates a version of the first theory according to which 
sensory feelings and emotions are properties (attributes, moments, 
aspects, modes of change) of sensations. In the same way that a sensa-
tion has a quality (red, hot, bitter), intensity, duration, and, in the case 
of the senses of touch and sight, a spatial extension and location, 
sensory feelings possess an affective tone [Gefühlston] as, for exam-
ple, the sensation of hunger and the unpleasant bodily feeling 
produced by this sensation. According to this theory, this attribute of 
affective tone represents the main property of emotions understood as 
bodily feelings (1928a, 18-19). 
Stumpf dedicated much of his 1899 paper to criticizing the James-
Lange sensualist theory of emotions. His discussion focused partly on 
the physiological assumptions of their theory and partly on their defi-
nition of emotions and bodily feelings. For the purposes of this study, 
we will emphasize Stumpf’s main objections to their definition of 
sensory feelings. Let us begin with an outline of James’s sensualist 
conception of emotions in ‘What is an Emotion?’ which Stumpf 
summarizes in this passage taken from his 1899 paper: 
 
The nature of affects consists in the peripheral bodily processes, 
which we regard as expressive movements, reactions, side effects; 
more precisely (since the affect is something mental) in the sensations 
and sensory feelings that we have from these peripheral bodily pro-
cesses. Trembling is fear, crying is sorrow, blush is shame; more 
specifically, again: the sensation of trembling and all changes related 
to blood vessels, respiratory and cardiac movements and so on, are 
fearing ... (1928a, 17) 
 
Stumpf’s first objection to this definition concerns James’s ideomotor 
hypothesis, according to which each and every sensation and presenta-
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tion (and the corresponding central processes in the brain) influences 
the peripheral processes of the body (Stumpf 1928, 32). This hypothe-
sis is central to James’s account of emotions defined in terms of the 
expression of movements and bodily reactions (crying is sorrow), 
understood as organic reactions and sensations. Stumpf argues that 
this hypothesis is not plausible because, as Reisenzein (2003) points 
out, it is not clear what adaptational value would result from a brain 
that is, to quote Stumpf, “like a tube through which every affective 
stimulus immediately flows to the periphery (…) and it is good luck, 
adds Stumpf, that we do not react so sensitively” (Stumpf 1928a, 82-
83). 
Stumpf’s second objection to this theory concerns the relation be-
tween physical sensations or bodily feelings and the underlying brain 
processes. He claims that James theory does not provide evidence as 
to the correspondence between peripheral bodily reactions and the 
underlying processes of the central nervous system (1928a, p. 38). It 
follows that James definition of affects in terms of organic sensations 
is at best a postulate. For even if we had such a proof, it could not be 
used to justify our actually experiencing these sensations, or more 
precisely, the phenomena understood as contents of sensations. Hence, 
Stumpf’s criticism of this definition of affects: it is not attributed to 
consciousness nor justified by the evidence of internal perception, to 
use Brentano’s expression, and it stands in flagrant contradiction with 
the basic principles of James radical empiricism (1928a, 37). 
Stumpf’s fourth objection is directed against the very form taken 
by James definition of emotions, i.e., as a definition by identification, 
which consists in reducing the definiendum to the definiens, such as 
by defining water in terms of its chemical properties. Stumpf claims 
that this type of definition must be reversible, i.e., to use James’ defi-
nition, if every emotion is a sensory feeling, then sensory feelings 
such as hunger and gastric pressure must also fall under the class of 
affective states (Stumpf 1928a, 38). Stumpf argues against James that 
the generic difference between sensory feelings and emotions rules 
out any attempt to reduce one of theses terms to the other. Further-
more, by not recognizing the specific distinction between phenomena 
and psychic functions and by seeking to reduce emotions to bodily 
feelings, James theory is unable to account for more complex emo-
tional experiences such as artistic emotions. In aesthetic experiences, 
and more specifically, in the aesthetic enjoyment provided, for exam-
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ple, by a work of art, there is a specific difference (and not only a 
difference in degree of intensity) between aesthetic enjoyment and 
bodily pain or sensory feelings such as the pleasure triggered by this 
object. For aesthetic enjoyment presupposes the involvement of judg-
ment and conceptual thought in general (Stumpf 1928a, 41-2). 
However, Stumpf attributes to James the merit of having shown, 
against the prevailing intellectualist conceptions of emotions, the 
importance of sensory feelings for a full-fledged theory of emotions. 
  
3 Stumpf’s criticism of Brentano  
In his book Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie und Theodizee, Georg 
Katkov, a pupil of O. Kraus in Prague, said of the controversy oppos-
ing Stumpf to Brentano’s theory of affects that it “is perhaps the most 
important reaction of modern psychology to Brentano’s ideas” (1937, 
94-95). Some aspects of the controversy were known at the time when 
Katkov published his book, in particular, through Brentano’s long 
footnote, which we mentioned above and in which Brentano discussed 
some of his disagreements with Stumpf on sensory feelings and emo-
tions. Part of Stumpf’s reaction to Brentano’s objections was 
published several years later in a paper entitled ‘Apology of Sensory 
Feelings,’ in which Stumpf finally recognizes the existence of signifi-
cant disagreements with Brentano, not only on sensory feelings and 
emotions, but also on several other aspects of his psychology. Howev-
er, the most important source of information on this controversy is 
their rich correspondence, which shows, namely, that these issues 
were the subject of many missives, from the publication in 1899 of 
Stumpf’s article on emotions until Brentano's death in 1917.2 All these 
                                                            
2 Brentano’s first reaction to Stumpf (1899) is a ten-page letter dated August 18, 1899, 
in which he criticizes Stumpf for having deviated from the original doctrine on the 
following points: the lack of a principle of classification that Brentano conceives of in 
this letter as intentional inexistence (1989, 59); and Stumpf’s rejection of Brentano’s 
classification into three classes (representation, judgment, and emotion) in favour of a 
classification whose two main classes are intellectual and emotional functions. Hence 
the question as to what justifies subsuming representations and judgments under the 
single class of intellectual functions. Brentano also questions the distinction within the 
class of affects between passive and active states. Finally, their positions differ on the 
nature of sensory feelings and phenomena (i.e. content of sensation). In reaction to 
Brentano’s letter, Stumpf merely tries to minimize his disagreement with Brentano 
and claims that he remains in agreement with the initial doctrine on most issues raised 
by Brentano’s letter. In ‘Über Gefühlsempfindungen’ (1928a, 4) Stumpf thought his 
views on emotions and sense feelings were in agreement with Brentano’s psychology 
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documents bear witness to the fact that this dispute concerns several 
key aspects of Brentano’s descriptive psychology: the classification of 
                                                                                                                                
on the basis of a conversation he had with the latter. However, in a letter dated Janu-
ary 1, 1907, Stumpf reports that he was told by Marty that he misunderstood once 
again Brentano. Brentano reminded Stumpf that he was absolutely not in agreement 
with his theory in a long footnote to his paper “From the psychological analysis of 
sound qualities in their properly first elements” (1907). In this footnote, Brentano 
summarizes in five points his main disagreements with Stumpf. For Stumpf, pleasure 
and pain are sensory qualities like colour and sound. For Brentano, they are emotions 
or mental phenomena. For Stumpf, there is nothing common between sensory pleas-
ure and enjoyment (Wohlgefallen); for Brentano, on the contrary, ‘die sinnliche Lust 
ist ein Wohlgefallen, der sinnliche Schmerz ist ein Missfallen, welche auf einen 
Empfindungsakt gerichtet sind, zu dem sie selbst gehören’ (2009, 177). They also 
disagree on the issue of internal perception: according to Brentano, the evidence of 
internal perception justifies the existence of pleasure and pain. As well, they disagree 
on the nature of sensations and their relation to mental acts. Brentano differs from 
Stumpf in his theory of primary and secondary objects: “Rather, it is for me the fact 
that each act of sensation has, in addition to its primary object, itself as a secondary 
object, or, as Aristotle says, en parergo, and in several ways; and that is the case of 
sensations of pleasure and pain as opposed to others (such as seeing and hearing), 
emotionally in particular, i.e. in the modes of love and hate” (2009, 178). By separat-
ing pleasure and displeasure from aesthetic enjoyment proper, Stumpf excludes, at the 
same time, pleasure and displeasure from the field of aesthetic enjoyment (1907, 238). 
In ‘Apology of Sensory Feelings’ (1916a), Stumpf responds to Brentano’s criticism. 
He now recognizes the existence of significant disagreements with Brentano not only 
on the matter of sense-feelings, but also on other fundamental aspects of his psychol-
ogy. Stumpf acknowledges the heterogeneous nature of affects or emotion, which fall 
under the class of functions, and the pleasure and displeasure that belong to the 
domain of sensory phenomena. This raises the question of what the relationship 
between sensory phenomena and functions or intentional acts consists in. It follows 
that pleasure and displeasure are different from aesthetic enjoyment understood as an 
emotion, which presupposes an act and whose object is a state of affairs. As a sensory 
phenomenon, the reality of pleasure and displeasure cannot, by definition, be justified 
by the evidence of internal perception since it applies only to mental acts or functions. 
Stumpf criticizes Brentano’s doctrine of primary and secondary objects, as we will 
see below. Stumpf claims that he does not exclude pleasure and displeasure from the 
field of aesthetics since he believes that sensory feelings are necessary conditions to 
experience any kind of aesthetic enjoyment. In one of his last letters to Stumpf dated 
from July 1916, Brentano comments on Stumpf’s responses in ‘Apology’ and his 
paper ‘Verlust der Gefühlsempfindungen im Tongebiete’ and accuses him of having 
misunderstood his position on several points because he does not take into account the 
results of his new research in the field of sensations. In this long letter, Brentano 
informs Stumpf of some of the changes in his conception of sensations and accuses 
the latter of dismissing the evidence of inner perception in the field of psychology. 
Finally, Stumpf concludes this long controversy with Brentano in the preface to his 
1928 book, in which Stumpf’s three main articles on affects are collected.  
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mental states; the criterion of this classification; external or sensory 
perception and the evidence of inner perception; Brentano’s theory of 
primary and secondary objects; and the nature of sensations and aes-
thetic enjoyment. Given the complexity and the number of issues 
raised in the course of these discussions, it is very difficult to make a 
sound and precise diagnosis on the ins and outs of the discussion and, 
above all, to identify the philosophical stakes that divide both philoso-
phers. Moreover, their respective positions evolved during the course 
of this period, so much so that Stumpf does not seem to have succeed-
ed in identifying Brentano’s final position on affects until 1916 
(Stumpf 1916). 
To resolve these difficulties, we will venture two hypotheses, one 
on the philosophical issues of this debate, the other on its motivations. 
Regarding the first, the philosophical issue lies in what might be 
called the intentionalist thesis or Brentano’s representationalism. In 
his paper “The Pleasant and the Beautiful,” Katkov makes a similar 
diagnosis when he says that Stumpf’s conception of sensory feelings 
contradicts Brentano’s intentionality thesis in such a way that it pre-
supposes from the outset a non-intentional mode of consciousness 
such as pain or pleasure, whose contents are precisely sensory phe-
nomena.3 Some remarks in Titchener's works on emotions follow 
along these lines.4 My second hypothesis is based on the fact that 
Stumpf was influenced by the criticism of his student Husserl, who in 
the Logical Investigations, and especially in Section 15 of the fifth 
Investigation, disputes Brentano’s theory of emotions. This seems to 
be confirmed by Stumpf in his 1916 paper (1928a, 104), in which he 
recognizes that he had simply failed to mention Husserl’s position in 
the Logical Investigations and the important distinction that Husserl 
                                                            
3 Katkov advocates Brentano’s position on this issue and argues against Stumpf that 
applying the terms ‘pleasure’ or ‘displeasure’ to sensory qualities is a denominationes 
extrinsecae because, originally, these terms refer to intentional relations much like the 
terms ‘the seen,’ ‘the heard,’ ‘the feared,’ and ‘the hoped for’ (1939, 184). Katkov’s 
main argument is based on the principle that every conscious state is intentional–
consciousness and intentionality being coextensive (1939, 181). 
4 The American psychologist E. B. Titchener (1908, 1917, 1929) has extensively 
discussed Stumpf’s theory of affects and he is one of Stumpf’s main interlocutors in 
his article ‘Apology of Sensory Feelings’ (1928, 113 ff). Titchener also took a stance 
in the debate opposing Brentano and his students on many aspects of his psychology, 
particularly in his Prolegomena, in which he claims that the main issue of this debate 
is Brentano’s intentionalism (1929, 177 ff). On this issue, see also Reisenzein (2003, 
261-2) and Reisenzein & Schönpflug (1992, 35). 
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makes between sensory feeling and emotion, on which Stumpf’s own 
criticism of Brentano is based. Stumpf’s remarks are important not 
only because the position he advocated on these issues is very close to 
Husserl’s but also because of the significant modifications Stumpf 
made to his original conception of sensory feelings as advocated in his 
1899 paper. These modifications concern primarily Stumpf’s theory of 
sensory perception and Brentano’s thesis that perception is a judg-
ment, which Stumpf abandoned during this period. 
Let us first address the first hypothesis. In section 15 of the fifth 
Investigation, Husserl raises the general question “as to whether the 
‘intentional relation’ suffices to demarcate ‘psychical phenomena’ 
(the domain of psychology) or not” (1982, 107). This question con-
cerns Brentano’s criterion for delineating the field of descriptive 
psychology from that of the natural sciences, i.e., what Brentano 
(1874) called intentional inexistence. Husserl wondered whether or 
not such a criterion justifies the classification based on the division 
between psychology understood as the “science of psychical phenom-
ena,” and the natural sciences understood as “sciences of physical 
phenomena.” However, this is precisely what Husserl challenges in 
this section: 
 
It can be shown that not all ‘psychical phenomena’ in the sense of a 
possible definition of psychology are psychical phenomena (i.e., men-
tal acts) in Brentano’s sense, and that, on the other hand, many 
genuine ‘psychical phenomena’ fall under Brentano’s ambiguous ru-
bric of ‘physical phenomena’. (1982, 94) 
 
Husserl argues against Brentano that phenomena such as Gefühlsemp-
findungen or sensory feelings, which belong to a stratum of 
experience that he calls, in the Logical Investigations, ‘primary con-
tents,’ do not fall under any of the two classes of phenomena in 
Brentano’s classification; hence, the criticism directed at Brentano for 
having confused, in his usage of the term Gefühl, sensory feeling 
(Gefühlsempfindung) with emotional state (Gefühlsact). The issue is 
whether pain and bodily pleasures, which are feelings associated with 
sensations of the senses (such as temperature, sound, taste, sound, and 
colour) are intentional states (such as joy, sadness, anger, hope, desire, 
and disgust), as Wundt and his followers (mainly Titchener and T. 
Ribot) claim, or whether they are sensory phenomena, as argued by 
advocates of sensualism such as James and Mach (Fisette, 2011). The 
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position advocated by Husserl in his Logical Investigations is based 
on the distinction between primary contents and mental states, and it 
consists in subsuming sensory feelings under the class of primary 
content, while maintaining with Brentano, contra the partisans of 
sensualism, that emotions such as shame or envy belong to the class of 
intentional acts.5 
Husserl’s position in his Logical Investigations is indeed very close 
to that advocated by Stumpf in his 1907 paper and in his 1906 treatise 
‘Phenomena and psychical functions,’ in which he frequently refers to 
this work of Husserl. In his paper on sensory feelings, Stumpf con-
firms that his revisions on the nature of sensory feelings were mainly 
motivated by his research on sensory perception (Stumpf 1928b, 95). 
Stumpf advocates a thesis that is similar to what today is called ‘direct 
perception,’ according to which sensory perception is a mode of con-
sciousness directly related to the sensory phenomena, i.e., without 
requiring the involvement of any concepts or any intentional items. It 
consists in a direct relation to sensory feelings, which are defined, as 
we saw above, as sensory qualities. This thesis is the result of 
Stumpf’s criticism of Brentano's thesis according to which “percep-
tion is a judgment” (Brentano 1874, 214), which Stumpf still 
advocated in his Psychology of Sound and most likely in his 1899 
paper on emotions (Stumpf 1924, 40). Stumpf argues that perception 
is not a judgment but a more primitive mode of consciousness that is 
prior to presentation and judgment, and which founds the latter and, 
therefore, the class of affective states as a whole (1906a, 16). On this 
new conception of perception is based Stumpf’s thesis, directed 
against Brentano and James, that there is a specific difference between 
the domain of sensory feelings and that of mental states such as emo-
tions, whose study falls within the domain of descriptive psychology 
                                                            
5 According to Husserl, Brentano’s principle according to which every state of con-
sciousness is either a representation or is based on a representation fails to account for 
sensory feelings, which are not, as Husserl pointed out in his Investigations, “pre-
sentative acts, in the term of acts of feeling-sensation, [that] underlie acts of feeling” 
(1982, 354). Husserl argues that many sensory feelings such as pleasure and pain that 
we usually range in the class of intentional states belong to the same genus as the 
sensations of touch, taste, or smell. One of Husserl's arguments is that the differences 
of intensity that we attribute to sensory contents, and therefore to pleasure and pain 
and to sensory feelings in general, are not attributes of psychical phenomena and thus 
of representations, as Brentano's theory of primary and secondary objects presupposes 
(1982, 111). For no predicate or attribute of the field of sensory content such as 
intensity or space is attributable to mental states (Fisette 2010). 
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understood in a narrow sense. Stumpf's entire argument against Bren-
tano’s views on emotions is based on this distinction. We will briefly 
examine the bearing of Stumpf’s criticism on some of the important 
theses which underly Brentano's theory of affects, and summarize 
Stumpf’s main arguments. 
Brentano’s thesis that Wahr-nehmung is a judgment, i.e., that in-
ternal perception is what is taken to be true and the only veridical 
perception, is responsible for the asymmetry between internal and 
external or sensory perception. This thesis confers internal perception 
with a double advantage over external perception: an ontological 
advantage because it warrants and justifies the existence and reality of 
what is perceived; an epistemological advantage because inner per-
ception is the only reliable source of knowledge, where knowledge is 
a justified belief, and any justification ultimately rests on the evidence 
of internal perception. Stumpf, after Husserl, recognizes that internal 
perception is indeed an important source of knowledge, but he does 
not admit that it is the only one. In fact, external perception, which 
Brentano, following Descartes, dismissed for being illusive and dubi-
table, is considered by both Husserl and Stumpf to be a source of 
knowledge as important as internal perception (Stumpf 1939, 215). 
Two consequences can be drawn from this: the first is ontological and 
challenges Brentano’s thesis that (physical) phenomena only exist 
intentionally, as opposed to mental phenomena which are the only 
ones to really exist; at the epistemic level, the domain of sensory 
phenomena, and therefore of sensory feelings, can now be regarded as 
a genuine source of knowledge. 
Stumpf’s position on Brentano’s conception of affects stands out 
more clearly in his criticism of Brentano’s theory of primary and 
secondary objects, which, according to R. Chisholm (1979), is the 
heart of the controversy opposing both philosophers on the issue of 
sensory feelings. This doctrine is clearly stated by Brentano in his 
Psychology of 1874 and is reformulated several times in his corre-
spondence and in the long footnote of 1907. Brentano claims that 
every perception has a primary object, for example, sound or colour, 
and a secondary object, which is the very act of presenting sounds or 
colours. 
 
The first is something sensually qualitative and the second is the act of 
sensation itself, to which the sensing (das Empfinden) always refers 
both in the mode of representing and that of acquiescing in the evident 
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judgment, and sometimes even emotionally; and the latter case occurs 
in sensory pleasure and in pain and results in relevant acts of sensation 
being distinguished from others as true emotions. (Brentano 1907, 
237)  
 
According to Brentano’s theory, the pleasure provided by the scent of 
a flower is a pleasure that stems not from the perfume as such, but 
from the smelling of the perfume, i.e., from an act of presentation 
which subsumes seeing and hearing (and sensing and the sensed). To 
use Stumpf’s metaphor (1928a, 109), this theory of primary and sec-
ondary objects places the sensory quality in a double set of brackets, 
and it is therefore doubly indirect: the first set of brackets represents 
the act of sensing; the second set of brackets represents a higher order 
act, namely, the act of emotion, to which pleasure and displeasure are 
associated. The doctrine of primary and secondary objects amounts to 
identifying pleasure and the act of sensing pleasure (primary and 
secondary objects being in the third class of acts) as one and the same 
thing. 
An important distinction introduced by Stumpf in his two 1906 
Academy treatises refers to that of first and second order phenomena, 
which constitutes Stumpf’s alternative to Brentano’s distinction be-
tween primary and secondary objects. First order phenomena are 
contents of sensation, while second order phenomena are “mnemonic 
images” and phenomena such as colour or sound as “merely repre-
sented.” The issue is whether, between sensation and representation, 
between primary and secondary objects, there is, as Brentano claims, a 
specific difference or simply a difference of degree, as Stumpf main-
tains (Stumpf, 1918). The difference between intensity and the 
“fullness of detail” of a piece of music and its mere representation in 
the imagination, for example, is not, following Brentano’s doctrine, a 
difference in the degree of intensity between phenomenal content and 
representational content, but rather a difference in the very act of 
presentation, which is, depending on the circumstances, more or less 
intense. Therefore, following Brentano, the properties that Stumpf 
attributes to phenomena, including intensity, are in fact properties of a 
class of mental states. Stumpf’s entire argument against Brentano’s 
theory is based on the idea that the properties of pleasure and pain, for 
example, cannot be reduced to properties of functions (representation-
al or emotional).  
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One of Stumpf’s arguments against Brentano stands out clearly in 
the classical case of localization as applied to cases of sensory feel-
ings. We may ask a patient to locate her pain by asking her whether 
she has a toothache or a headache. However, we cannot ask her to 
locate her anger or sadness. Now, space or location, just like intensity, 
is an attribute of tactile and visual phenomena, not of functions. It 
follows first that sensory pleasure and pain are phenomena in the same 
way as colour is, for example. It follows secondly that we cannot 
speak of a specific difference between the contents of first and second 
order phenomena, i.e., between representation and sensation. There is, 
indeed, a specific difference between an act or a mental state and its 
content, but there is only a difference of degree between the content of 
a presentation and that of sensing (Stumpf 1939, 348). As we saw 
above, these sensory contents are founding contents (phenomena) as 
opposed to founded contents (intentional) of mental states such as 
emotions, which are states of affairs.6 
 
4 Mixed feelings: Emotions cum fundamentum in sensory feelings 
The question is how does Stumpf reconcile in his overall theory of 
affects the phenomenological dimension of sensory feelings with the 
intentional dimension of affective states, while avoiding at the same 
time the objections made to Brentano’s representationalism (of inten-
tionalizing sensory feelings) and to James’s phenomenalism (of 
sensualizing the intentional content of affective states). We saw that 
most of Stumpf’s arguments against both rival theories were based on 
the thesis that there is a specific difference between the fields of sen-
sory phenomena and psychical functions and therefore that these two 
heterogeneous aspects of experience are irreducible. As we have 
shown, Stumpf's position on the classification of acts and his defini-
tion of emotions as a subclass of affective states whose objects are 
states of affairs is incomplete because it does not account for the 
essential role of sensory feelings within his theory of emotions. We 
also pointed out that the modifications that Stumpf made to his origi-
                                                            
6 Another argument worth mentioning is based on the case of anhedonia, which 
Stumpf (1916a) applied to the pathological case of a musician suffering from an 
evident inability to feel pleasure in listening to music or other activities that were 
previously perceived as pleasant. In such cases, the sense of hearing itself is not 
significantly affected. Stumpf argues that anhedonia to musical notes would result in 
an apathy or a loss of enjoyment and emotion toward music in general. Hence the idea 
that sensory feelings are a necessary condition to affects. 
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nal conception of affects in his 1899 paper proceeded more or less 
along the same lines. In this regard, we have to take into account the 
bearing of these modifications on Stumpf’s early criticism of James. 
For while his criticism of James in 1899 suggested that no true com-
promise was possible with sensualism, Stumpf’s later works are much 
more sympathetic to the sensualism of Condillac or James and reveal 
an important contribution to his own theory of emotions (1939, 337). 
Part of the solution to the problem of the relationship between sen-
sory feelings and emotions is formulated in Stumpf’s important paper 
‘Phenomena and Psychical Functions,’ in which he argues that mental 
states and phenomena form a real unity that can only be separated by 
abstraction. Stumpf conceives of phenomena as wholes, not as aggre-
gates of sensations, and they appear to consciousness as unitary and 
structured wholes. As unitary wholes, complex phenomena are con-
tents of sensation, which are characterized by certain properties that 
Stumpf calls attributes of sensation (or sometimes psychological or 
metaphysical parts). These attributes entertain different kinds of rela-
tions with phenomena, including relations of fusion and part-whole 
relations. These relations are not imposed from without or produced 
by conceptual thought or by mental functions, but are rather given 
(and perceived directly) together with the phenomena. As we have 
noted above, Stumpf considers sensory perception as the most primi-
tive function, which underlies Brentano’s class of representation 
within his own classification. In its most general sense, sensory per-
ception is understood as a Bemerken or a ‘noticing’ (of parts in 
wholes), or as attention, which Stumpf defined in the first book of his 
Tonpsychologie as ‘Lust am Bemerken.’ This characterization applies 
both to inner perception, oriented toward mental states, and sensory 
perception, which is directly related to first order phenomena, i.e., 
directed toward attributes and the relations they have with their sub-
stance (quality) (1906a, p. 16). In visual perception, noticing relates to 
parts of the perceived, for example, intensity, colour, and space, and 
to relations of similarity, fusion, dependency, etc., while the whole, or 
the perceived, as such, is a second order presentation. For example, in 
the hearing of a melody, sounds and notes are noticed while the melo-
dy, which Stumpf conceives of as a Gestalt, is perceived as a second 
order phenomenon. 
Now, we said above that there is a hierarchy in the class of intel-
lectual functions between perception and judgment. This hierarchy is 
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understood as a relation of foundation between higher order mental 
states and more primitive ones, between foundational contents (first 
order phenomena) of the sensory perception and founded contents of 
judgments. The relation of foundation between these two levels of 
complexity can be understood in terms of ontological dependence (the 
existence of the judgment’s contents depends, in turn, on that of the 
phenomena) or in psychological terms (conceptual contents of judg-
ments are the result of a process of abstraction based on sensory 
contents). This relation of foundation is also obtained between affec-
tive states and the class of intellectual functions to the extent that 
judgments provide emotions with their matter, and we saw that emo-
tions, though more complex than the former, are nevertheless 
structured in the same way. Between the subclasses of passive and 
active affects, between emotion, desire, and will, there is a hierarchy 
similar to that which exists in the class of mental states, with the dif-
ference that the phenomenal basis of affective states is nothing other 
than sensory feelings: 
 
My theory of the ‘sensory feelings’ [Gefuhlsempfindungen] is there-
fore that there is a class of sensory phenomena, to which such 
elementary feelings are primarily attached, that expressions such as 
pain, tickle, etc. essentially designate sensory feelings, and that the 
purely sensory agreeableness of sounds, colours, smells and other sen-
sory impressions is grounded in the admixture of such specific 
sensory feelings. (1928a, p. IX) 
 
These elementary feelings are triggered directly either by the stimula-
tion of peripheral bodily organs, such as the sensation of pain on the 
skin, or by central processes in the brain. In both cases, however, 
these feelings are not mediated by any psychical functions (1928a, p. 
ix). Stumpf argues that each and every function belonging to the class 
of active or passive affective states are lustvoll in that they are all 
intimately linked to pleasure (1928a, p. XII). The difference between 
an elementary feeling and an emotion lies primarily in the conceptual 
contribution of the judged state of affairs to emotions, and conse-
quently, to the whole class of affective states. 
As we pointed out earlier, Stumpf’s classification raises several 
problems, the most important of which, in the present context, is the 
relation between emotion and judgment and that of emotion and sen-
sory feelings. The first problem has been studied by Reisenzein 
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(2003), who understands Stumpf’s theory of emotions as evaluative 
states directed toward the object of a judgment. The evaluative com-
ponent of an emotion rests on a positive or negative stance vis-à-vis 
the judged state of affairs. The distinction between these two classes 
of function would therefore rest on their quality, i.e., in the positive or 
negative attitude toward their objects: affirmation and negation in the 
case of judgment; love and hate in the case of emotions. According to 
Reisenzein, the relation of foundation between emotions and judg-
ments or beliefs presupposes, on the one hand, a causal relation 
between the belief and the evaluation, and on the other hand, a partic-
ular semantic (or intentional) relation between the intentional content 
of belief and the emotion. 
Let us consider the case of jealousy in order to illustrate these two 
aspects which characterize the relationship between belief and emo-
tion. Jealousy is considered on this account as a negative attitude and 
as an evaluation of the state of affairs that someone else owns a good 
that is desired or coveted for oneself but that ones does not own; and 
this state of affairs would be caused by the belief or the judgment that 
this state of affairs exists (true existential judgment). However, this 
case is misleading because, as Stumpf himself points out, jealousy 
belongs to the subclass of active feelings in that it presupposes the 
desirability of the judged state of affairs and the value of the coveted 
good. It presupposes indeed an evaluation and a choice. In contrast, 
the subclass of passive sentiments, to which disgust and aesthetic 
enjoyment belong, does not seem to presuppose such an evaluation, 
and their object does not consist in a value (or Wertverhalt), but rather 
a state of affairs. On the other hand, there is indeed a causal relation 
between desire and will (or the intention to achieve what ought to be), 
but there is no causal relation according to Stumpf’s theory between a 
belief (or its content) and the corresponding attitude. In fact, the 
source of an emotion, or what triggers an aesthetic experience, for 
example, is not a belief or its intentional object as such, but precisely 
the sensory feeling triggered by primary content understood as a struc-
tured phenomenon (a Gestalt, precisely) originally given in 
experience. It is first and foremost primary content that can provide 
pleasure or displeasure, and it is precisely this sensory feeling that 
constitutes the sensory basis (the founding content) of a more complex 
intentional act. The relationship between such elementary feelings and 
emotions is comparable to that between sensory perception and judg-
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ment in such a way that the founding content of affects (i.e., the struc-
tured phenomenon as such) constitutes the raw material of more 
complex intentional states (whose content is actually the conceptual 
working out of the original sensory content) such as emotions.7 
The case of aesthetic enjoyment is more suited to the present con-
text because it represents, in Stumpf's writing on emotions, a 
paradigmatic case of emotions and illustrates the intimate relationship 
between this class of affective states and sensory feelings. In one of 
his earlier writings on the nature of enjoyment in tragedy, Stumpf 
regarded the problem of the immediate action (Wirkung) of a work of 
art in the production of an artistic enjoyment (Genuss) as the main 
difficulty in the field of aesthetics (1910, 5). In his paper on sensory 
feelings, Stumpf tackles this problem with that of defining sensory 
feelings precisely in terms of the actions they exert on the soul (Ge-
müt) (1928a, 69). He carefully distinguishes the pleasure brought 
about by a piece of music from the aesthetic enjoyment proper, which 
corresponds to the distinction in music between euphony (the sensory 
effects produced by rhythm) and the enjoyment and agreeableness 
obtained through the structure, technical execution, and the content of 
the piece of music (1924, 53-54). The first factor involves only senso-
ry feelings, while the second, which varies according to the musical 
knowledge of the listener, is related to the aesthetic object itself. 
However, aesthetic enjoyment is conditioned both by the sensory 
                                                            
7 Despite the merits of this stimulating study of Reisenzein on Stumpf’s theory of 
emotions and the useful references to contemporary theories of emotions, there are at 
least two aspects of his interpretation that I disagree with. The first concerns the 
causal relation between judgments or beliefs and attitudes (Reisenzein 2003, 241-2). 
The only textual support that I have found in this paper is a reference to a passage in 
Stumpf’s first study (1899, 50), in which, in fact, there is no mention of any causal 
relation. The second problem with this interpretation is the understanding of the 
subclass of affective states in terms of the so-called occurrent pro-evaluations and 
con-evaluations, i.e., approvals and disapprovals of states of affairs (Reisenzein & 
Schönpflug 1992, 35). This neo-Kantian interpretation (à la Windelband), which 
amounts to regarding all classes of attitudes as evaluation, was criticized by Brentano 
and Stumpf (1906b, 57-8). Belief is not an evaluation but a judgment about the 
existence or nonexistence of the judged state of affairs, i.e., about the truth of falsity 
of the propositional content of the judgment. Stumpf’s definition of passive emotional 
states as states that have as their object something existent, i.e., a state of affairs, 
shows sufficiently clearly that emotional states presuppose such a judgment. Affective 
states, on the other hand, comprise an evaluation, but this element belongs to the 
subclass of active states that Stumpf defined in terms of obligation and whose object 
is a value or what might be called, following Meinong, a Wertverhalt. 
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feelings directly obtained directly through the way we experience a 
piece of music and by the form and content of its object. Hence the 
distinction between two sources of aesthetic emotions: the first is 
called the fullness or wealth of formal relations among its parts, which 
are involved in the experience of a genuine work of art; the second 
involves the properties of the object, or more precisely, of the judged 
state of affairs (Stumpf 1928a, 9). 
The first source is of a phenomenological origin and lies in the 
formal relations that are directly given to consciousness. The action 
produced by a work of art is inherently direct and immediate in a 
sense comparable to the experience of having a pain or a sexual or-
gasm; therefore, it rules out any differences that may result from 
culture, knowledge of the contemplated objects, or world-view (his-
torical, cultural, or other). Stumpf recognizes that sensory feelings 
alone cannot produce an aesthetic affect, as such, without the aid of 
conceptual thought or representation. For aesthetic enjoyment can 
only arise when sensations and a combination of sensations are “en-
tangled” with an act, i.e., with a passive affective state. The feeling of 
pleasure is immediately linked to an activity as sensory pleasure is to 
sensations, but it is not yet an emotion in the strict sense of the term. It 
becomes an emotion in the enjoyment (Entzücken) provided by a work 
of art, for example, as soon as, and only when, the intuited unitary 
relations are objectified by consciousness and become an intentional 
object. However, these two sources represent two essential conditions 
of emotions, including aesthetic enjoyment, and they form a whole 
that can only be separated through abstraction (Stumpf 1928a, 111). 
 
5 Final remarks 
To conclude, let us consider an alternative to Reisenzein's causal 
interpretation of Stumpf's theory of emotions. According to this alter-
native interpretation, which is based on part-whole relations, an 
emotion consists in a whole whose parts are its content (the judged 
state of affairs) and sensory feelings, which exert a triggering action 
on the emotion without being emotions themselves. This mereological 
interpretation has the advantage of accounting for the phenomenologi-
cal contribution of sensory feelings in Stumpf’s overall theory of 
affects, which the causal theory does not seriously take into account. 
This interpretation also finds support in Stumpf's thesis on the unity of 
consciousness and has the further advantage of allowing for a connec-
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tion with James on this issue. This is confirmed by H. Langfeld, an 
American student of Stumpf in Berlin, in his commentary on Stumpf’s 
1906-1907 lectures on psychology. Langfeld reports that Stumpf 
stressed several times in these lectures the importance of his views on 
the unity of consciousness for his psychology, and mentioned several 
times the name of James in relation to this topic. According to 
Langfeld, Stumpf “took a position similar to that of James against the 
atomistic theory. The unity of consciousness is not a sum of parts but 
a totality, the parts of which are recognized only through abstraction” 
(Langfeld 1937, 55). This is also the position taken by Stumpf in 
several of his works vis-à-vis the antagonism not only between sensu-
alism and intellectualism, but also between nativism and empiricism, 
between the psychology of acts and the psychology of contents, and 
between hedonism and stoicism in the field of ethics. 
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